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Abstract 
This study contributes to the debate on whether China’s domestic enterprises (DEs) 
have experienced a significant catch-up compared with foreign-funded enterprises 
(FFEs) in high-tech industries. Our paper tries to estimate a new set of capital stock 
and R&D capital stock by ownership for China’s high-tech industries. Then, using this 
newly constructed data set, it assesses the comparative productivity performance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (as the most important proxy for DEs) in high-tech 
industries from 1996 to 2006. The results show that SOEs as a whole have 
experienced an inverted U-shape trajectory of catch-up for 1996-2006, while those 
SOEs which originate from competitive industries tend to show a better performance. 
With respect to the technology catch-up, SOEs in particular are still lagging behind 
because of their failure to develop indigenous technology capabilities. 
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1 Introduction 
The dramatic rise of China’s high-tech industries1 since the mid-1990s has been 
queried by critics because of its stagnation in the lower end of the value chain2 and its 
excessive reliance on foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) (Gilboy, 2004; Ning, 2007). 
The opposition, however, contends that persistent marketization and China’s 
government-led industrial policy, which aimed to construct globally-competitive 
companies by vertically integrating and reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
have already reduced the technology gap between domestic enterprises (DEs) and FFEs 
(Jefferson, 2005) and will further accelerate the catch-up process with farsighted 
initiatives such as the Independent Innovation Strategy (IIS) (OECD, 2007). 
Unfortunately, up to this point, neither sides in this debate has been able to justify their 
assertions with well-defined and widely accepted indicators to measure the gap 
between DEs and FFEs, let alone to summarize the dynamics of this gap as solid 
empirical evidence. 
This paper attempts to contribute to this debate by conducting a comparative 
productivity analysis of SOEs which dominates other DEs in nearly all aspects in 
high-tech industries (NBS, 2002, 2007b), and FFEs. A portfolio of conventional 
productivity measurements, as well as some novel ones, will be adopted and calculated 
to evaluate the overall catch-up performance of SOEs. Our results, in general, reveal an 
inverted U-shape curve across different productivity measurements in terms of the 
catch-up performance of the SOEs from 1996 to 2006. Such unfavourable facts cast 
doubt on the efficacy of China’s current industrial policy which aims to achieve 
technological pre-eminence by favouring SOEs as the backbone. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the 
development of China’s high-tech industries and the divergent assessments of it as 
found in the recent literature. Section 3 explains the rationale of conducting a 
productivity analysis to evaluate the DEs’ catch-up performance and addresses several 
technical problems, particularly looking into the estimation of capital stock and 
research and development (R&D) capital stock. Section 4 reports the results of our 
estimations and calculations, followed by a discussion on their policy implications. 
Section 5 concludes the analysis of this paper. 
 
 
                                                        
1
 The definition of high-tech industries in China is the same as in OECD countries (Table 1). However, this 
definition and associated industrial statistics only came into being after 1994, when the most recent adjustment 
took place in the Chinese industrial classification (IC) system so as to better comply with the ISIC. Therefore, 
official statistics about China’s high-tech industries under the current IC system have only been available since 
1995. 
2
 Hence, China’s high-tech industries have been mostly those concerned with processing and assembling imported 
critical components. 
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2 Elements of China’s High-Tech Industries Development 
China’s persistent struggle to achieve rapid and sustained economic growth has been 
made conspicuous by the critical role attached to the modernization of science and 
technology, ever since the 1950s when the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
proclaimed “the love of science” to be a national virtue. By the onset of the Cultural 
Revolution, China’s emerging science and technology (S&T) system, while still 
modest in scope, began to produce some promising results. In 1964, for instance, the 
Chinese trial-produced an electronic computer (second-generation) and successfully 
tested an atomic bomb (Simon, 1989). Unfortunately, the subsequent launching of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1965 became a major setback for Chinese S&T. The efforts by 
Mao and later the “gang of four” (Si Ren Bang) to promote science and technology 
through reliance on the “mass line” (Qunzhong Luxian), as opposed to an elite core of 
qualified personnel, led to a dismantling of the infrastructure that had been built up over 
a decade. Meanwhile, the computer and electronics revolution began in the 
industrialized world during the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a consequence, the 
technology gap which had been diminishing between China and the developed 
countries widened again. More devastatingly, China lost almost a complete generation 
of scientific and technical personnel as a result of the closure of most universities and 
research institutes in the Cultural Revolution (Deng and Treiman, 1997). 
China’s post-Mao experience: namely, three decades of reform and opening-up, has 
witnessed a development strategy in the high-tech industries (Table 1) which could be 
simplified as “walking with two legs” (Yao, 2006)—the first “leg” is relying on imports 
of foreign technologies, including direct imports and foreign direct investment (FDI); 
the other “leg”, in contrast, is fostering domestic research and innovation through the 
synergetic effect among universities, research institutes and industries (Simon, 1989; 
Story, 2005). Ideally, a well-coordinated, balanced and combined movement of these 
two “legs” will allow China’s high-tech industries to benefit not only from international 
technology transfer and spillovers but also from indigenized innovation favoured by the 
government. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
In spite of China’s soaring volume of high-tech exports, some observers viewed the 
foregoing “two legs” strategy as vain talk and pointed out that China’s technology 
catch-up was actually crippled by the severe dependency on imported technology. By 
stressing that foreign firms are still claiming the lion’s share of China’s R&D 
investment, as well as of exports from the high-tech industries, while its domestic 
technology leader, the SOEs, are severely addicted to imported technologies, Gilboy 
(2004) depicted the Chinese high-tech industry structure as one composed of inefficient 
yet powerful SOEs, increasingly dominant FFEs, and a private sector that is unable to 
compete with others on equal terms. In addition, from an institutional perspective, 
Gilboy has generalized China’s “industrial strategic culture”, which is distorted by its 
unreformed political system, as an encouragement to seek short-term profit, local 
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autonomy, and excessive diversification. This “culture” tends to chronically jeopardize 
networking efforts among firms, industries and research institutes, to deny investment 
in long-term technology development and diffusion, and to indulge inefficiency and 
technological dependency with local protectionism and particularism, which together 
will prevent DEs in high-tech industries from catching up with their foreign-funded 
competitors.  
Ning (2007) further complemented Gilboy’s proposition by showing that China’s 
most competitive high-tech export industry, the information and communication 
technology (ICT) sector, has mainly been processing imported materials and applying 
mature, standardized and peripheral technology, while most value-added content is 
created elsewhere in the world. What is more frustrating, even this low value-added 
high-tech sector has also been more and more dominated by FFEs in terms of sales, 
profits, exports and new products generation. Therefore, Ning concluded that the 
Chinese government’s attempt to build globally-competitive larger ICT firms by 
reforming SOEs is falling short of its goal. 
In contrast, Jefferson (2005) argued that overuse of the share in total high-tech 
products export as an indicator to compare the performance of SOEs and FFEs tended 
to ignore the more subtle story of China’s technological transformation, where more 
labour-using and capital- and energy-saving innovations have been produced. By 
exploiting a firm-level data set which was based on surveys of large- and medium-sized 
enterprises (LMEs), Jefferson revealed that Gilboy had significantly underestimated 
the DEs’ technological catch-up effort in terms of R&D investment3 . Moreover, 
Jefferson refuted Gilboy’s assertion with additional national-level data: first, the 
national R&D intensity (the ratios of R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP) of 
China had rapidly climbed to 1.3 percent in 2003, substantially greater than what would 
be expected given the country’s level of per capita income; second, the preceding surge 
in China’s R&D intensity had resulted from the boom in enterprise-financed R&D 
rather than from government funding, indicating a more market-oriented and 
commercialized innovation structure. Accordingly, his conclusion is that R&D has 
become extensively and deeply embedded in, but not limited to, China’s high-tech 
industries and has thus enabled the country to experience S&T take-off. Later on, more 
of the literature supported Jefferson’s judgment with updated descriptive data (Chen 
and Shi, 2005; OECD, 2006, 2007), as well as some in-depth case studies centring on 
selected high-tech industries (Fan, 2006; Jin and Zedtwitz, 2008). 
While the efficacy of the “two leg” strategy was still in dispute, new initiatives had 
already been endorsed by the Chinese government to raise the original expectation of 
the catch-up effort: namely, to build an innovative country4. Not surprisingly, the newly 
                                                        
3
 Jefferson (2005) calculated that, from 1995 to 2001, China’s domestic LME’s R&D intensity (R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of value added) had reached 3.3 percent, instead of the mere 1 percent reported by Gilboy. 
4
 In February 2006, the Chinese State Council issued the “National Guidelines on a Medium- and Long-term 
Program for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020” (hereafter, “S&T Guideline”). Along with more 
innovation assessment indicators such as the numbers of patents and international academic publications, the 
Chinese government defined that in 15 years, China’s R&D expenditure in GDP will reach 2.5 percent; science 
and technology progress will contribute at least 60 percent of the country’s development; and the country's reliance 
on foreign technology will decline to 30 percent and below (Zhu, 2006). Shortly afterwards, this guidelines 
evolved into a new alternative-technology enhancing strategy: namely, the Independent Innovation Strategy (IIS), 
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announced S&T Guidelines and IIS both shed more light on improving what is called 
the “independent innovation capability” of DEs, where SOEs in high-tech industries 
have been expected to play a leading role, since they account for the bulk of advanced 
industrial production in China and occupy the country’s best R&D resources (Zheng 
and Chen, 2006). However, the prospect of these ambitious plans being realized is 
partly dependent on the evaluation of the SOEs’ catch-up performance in high-tech 
industries. 
3 Key Factors in Productivity Analysis in China 
3.1 Prefatory Remarks 
A more straightforward and well-received approach to measure the technology 
catch-up performance is productivity analysis (Jorgenson, 1995; OECD, 2001; Solow, 
1957), particularly when the contribution from technology progress and its 
determinants, e.g. R&D investment, are under examination (Griliches, 1979, 1986, 
1988, 1994). Studies using this approach to investigate China’s catch-up performance 
can be found in the works of Szirmai et al. (2001), Timmer (1999) and Wu (2001). 
Though far from perfect, productivity analysis does after all rely on composite 
indicators which can measure a producer’s efficiency in utilizing various kinds of 
resources as input. In contrast, indicators employed by the aforementioned literature, 
such as the share in total export (Gilboy, 2004), the number of patent obtained (Ning, 
2007; Yao, 2006) and R&D intensity (Jefferson, 2005; OECD, 2006), were 
undoubtedly plagued by their one-dimensional measurement, which merely focused on 
input or output. Moreover, according to their users, most of these indicators are 
considered to be an inferior substitute for the productivity indicators. If such is the case, 
why would these studies relinquish the idea of conducting a productivity analysis? 
A standard productivity analysis normally requires the data on input to conform to a 
stock measurement. Therefore, acute problems such as the data’s availability and 
reliability may stem from the process of capital stock estimation (i.e. tangible fixed 
assets, as given in the 1993 SNA) and ultimately prevent the researchers from adopting 
this approach. In the case of China, for instance, since the official data available on 
fixed assets suffer from inappropriate treatments of aggregation and depreciation, 
inconsistencies in industrial classification, and lack of information on prices, the 
estimation of capital stock has become a major obstacle to accurately assess the 
productivity performance of the Chinese economy as a whole or across different 
industries (Holz, 2006; Wu and Xu, 2002). This dilemma explains, to some extent, the 
elusion from the current literature of productivity analysis as an approach to investigate 
DEs’ catch-up performance in China’s high-tech industries. 
                                                                                                                                                              
which was first referred to in China’s “11th Five-Year Plan” announced in October 2006 (Pan,2006) and then 
reaffirmed by the CPC’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” promulgated one year later (Hu,2007). 
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The pilot studies of Wang and Szirmai (2003b; 2005), however, probed this terra 
incognita. Their preliminary empirical results, in particular, the estimation of net capital 
stock and net R&D capital stock across China’s high-tech industries, became very 
helpful benchmarks for the future research. Meanwhile, the theoretical and operational 
guidelines offered by their works suggested directions for others to follow as well. As 
long as there are properly structured data sets, the progress they made, as described 
above, will allow successors to proceed from more disaggregated aspects, especially 
some comparative productivity analyses among predefined individuals. 
3.2 Measuring the Capital Stock by Ownership  
In this subsection, we attempt to estimate the capital stock of SOEs and FFEs5, 
respectively, across every Chinese high-tech industry from 1996 to 2006. This attempt 
is made possible mainly by a combination of the intellectual guidance from Wang and 
Szirmai (2003b; 2005) and the recently publicized data from China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS, 2002, 2007b), where the aggregate data at industry level have been 
decomposed by ownership, by firm size, and by province.  
However, it is noteworthy that, rather than an unconditional acceptance of Wang and 
Szirmai’s (2003b; 2005) methodology, our estimation of the capital stock by ownership 
in China’s high-tech industries was simply based on the official “net value of fixed 
assets” (Guding Zicha Jingzhi) deflated by the national annual price index for fixed 
assets investment(NBS, 2007a). Such simplification can be justified by the following 
two aspects in principle: 
First, in order to comply with the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM), Wang and 
Szirmai (2003b; 2005) imposed a great many data assumptions in their estimation 
which are incompatible with the specific requirements of, and availability of data for 
our research. For instance, Wang and Szirmai applied the incremental capital-output 
ratios (ICORs) proposed by Timmer (1999) to calculate the initial benchmark estimate 
of the capital stock, which assumes that the incremental capital-output ratio will 
approximate the average capital-output ratio if the economy is at full capacity. However, 
we can not really we believe that the newly sprung high-tech industries in China, 
operating in an environment of constant policy and technology change, have been 
working at full capacity during the reform period, especially considering their abrupt 
increase in production capacity after China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. At this point, even the averaged ICORs which Wang and 
Szirmai eventually adopted in their research would not prevail in the Chinese economic 
context. Therefore, while, according to PIM, the time series of investment available 
from NBS(2002; 2007b) are too short to construct an initial benchmark estimate 
separately for SOEs and FFEs in each high-tech industry, Wang and Szirmai’s solution 
with the unrealistic assumption mentioned above appears to be undesirable as well. 
                                                        
5
 In the China Statistic Book on High Technology Industry (NBS, 2002, 2007b), an alternative expression of 
“FFEs” has been adopted: namely, the “Tri-capitalized Enterprises” (Sanzi Qiye), which includes the subcategories: 
the “Sino-foreign Joint Ventures”, the “Sino-foreign Cooperative Enterprises” and the “Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprises”. 
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This is because further assumptions have to be made to decompose ICORs by 
ownership, which all together will intensify the deviation from reality to an 
unacceptable extent. Likewise, the breakdown of fixed assets by major asset type and 
the differentiation of depreciation rates by industry can not be performed either. 
Second, as a matter of fact, the official aggregate industrial data in China generally 
can not be applied for PIM without overall revaluations (OECD, 2003). But serious 
revaluations so far have usually relied on unpublished sources and, ironically, some 
arbitrary assumptions (Wu and Xu, 2002). In this regard, caution should be exercised 
when such revaluations are employed, since sometimes the cure might be worse than 
the disease. The worry about choosing a “bad cure” hence obliges us to search for a new 
proxy for capital stock instead of the PIM estimation—the Chinese convention of 
calculating the current year’s gross capital stock or “original value of fixed assets” in 
official terms is to add the value of the investment in fixed assets in the current year to 
the value of the existing stock of fixed assets at historical or acquisition prices; the 
official net capital stock or “net value of fixed assets”, also at historical prices, is 
evidently obtained by applying some unpublicized depreciation rates to this stock. This 
convention is accused of failing to deflate the capital stock which is mixed with 
different types of assets, e.g. buildings, equipment and machinery, and of making no 
attempt to clarify the depreciation method (Wang and Szirmai, 2005; Wu and Xu, 2002). 
However, if we tolerate the unexplained depreciation rates underlying the official net 
capital stock and apply a common yet weighted fixed assets deflator (NBS, 2007a) to it, 
the methodological and operational consistency will be retained in the new data set 
(OECD, 2003). We would certainly not claim the superiority of our methodology over 
the PIM estimation before better data sets and more comparable empirics become 
available. But for the purpose of this paper, at least, our simplification will suffice 
without risking the “bad cure”. 
Applying the methodology above, we obtain the net capital stock for SOEs and FFEs 
across the high-tech industries (Appendix Table B-1).  
3.3 R&D Capital Stock and Other Inputs 
Also indispensable in this research is the estimation of R&D capital stock which 
accordingly serves the efficiency analysis of R&D input, the key independent variable 
for the development of endogenous technology capability, is. By following the 
methodology proposed in Wang and Szirmai (2003b), we could obtain the R&D capital 
stock of SOEs and FFEs in China’s high-tech industries from 1996 to 2006 (Appendix 
Table B-2). Since our estimation strictly obeyed the technical guidance established by 
Wang and Szirmai, for the sake of brevity, we will not repeat those principles here. One 
slight adjustment, however, is that we manage to find that the average real wage index 
(NBS, 2007a) is a more accurate substitute for the consumer price index employed by 
Wang and Szirmai, in the calculation of the R&D price index. 
The drawbacks of Wang and Szirmai’s methodology are again those strong 
assumptions (to name just a few) that are imposed on the structure of the lag operator 
which connects past R&D expenditure to the current increase in technological 
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knowledge, i.e. the rate of obsolescence of R&D capital; and the isolation from 
knowledge spillovers. As a matter of fact, this defect of arbitrary assumption is still a 
universal hurdle to a more reliable estimation of R&D capital stock, especially because 
of the data constraints (Griliches, 1979, 1994). 
In our data set, fortunately, there is a non-monetary R&D input measurement in a 
flow sense: namely, the man-years statistic in R&D activities which is exempted from 
the preceding assumptions. The man-years (or man-hours) statistic in general 
production activities has been widely accepted and applied as a proxy for labour input 
in developed countries (Lucas, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 1957). Accordingly, 
it is reasonable to infer a definition of “R&D labour productivity” from the precedent 
that labour productivity is a measurement for the efficiency of R&D personnel input. 
Therefore, we expect that the man-years statistic in R&D activities may allow us to 
compare the R&D input and thus its efficiency between SOEs and FFEs from a 
complementary perspective. 
As usual, man-years (or man-hours) data for general production activities in 
high-tech industries are not reported by NBS. In response, we follow the convention of 
Chow and Li (2002), Szirmai et al. (2001) and Wu (2001) to measure the labour input 
with employment data as a preparation for the calculation of labour productivity.  
3.4 The Measurement of Productivity 
As is well known, there are different measurements for productivity, and each one is 
suited to its own purpose. The choice between them depends on the purpose of the 
productivity measurement and, in many cases, on the availability of data (OECD, 2001). 
In this paper, we attempt to assess the overall catch-up performance of SOEs (used as a 
proxy for DEs because of their dominant output share in high-tech industries) 
compared to FFEs in three dimensions: welfare, efficiency, and technology. 
Accordingly, we need to first choose the proper productivity measures for each 
dimension, and then calculate the gap between SOEs and FFEs by comparing the 
associated productivity measures. 
Previous studies which related China’s catch-up performance to its productivity 
change tended to misinterpret some single-factor productivity measures6 , e.g. the 
labour productivity, as direct indicators for technical change (Szirmai et al., 2001; Wu, 
2001). However, labour productivity and capital productivity based on value added are 
actually only partial productivity measures that reflect the joint influences of a host of 
factors. A more straightforward and reliable interpretation of labour productivity based 
on value added should be confined to its link to income per capita, which gives it a 
welfare significance. Likewise, changes in capital productivity based on value added 
indicate the extent to which output can be achieved with lower costs in the form of 
foregone consumption: namely, the efficiency of capital utilization. With respect to 
technology, conceptually, the capital-labour-energy-materials (KLEMS) multifactor 
                                                        
6
 Single-factor productivity measures are normally calculated by relating a measure of output to a single measure 
of input, while the multifactor productivity measures are calculated by relating a measure of output to a bundle of 
inputs (OECD, 2001).  
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productivity is the most appropriate tool to measure disembodied technical change by 
industry, as the role of intermediate inputs in production is fully acknowledged. More 
often than not, as in our case, data and resource constraints do not permit a full coverage 
of intermediate inputs and the differentiation of labour and capital according to their 
quality improvement, which blurs the linkage between multifactor productivity and 
technical change (OECD, 2001).  
A review of the notions of the different productivity measures described above 
enables us to justify that the single labour productivity measure and the capital 
productivity measure based on value added should be applied to assess the catch-up 
performance in terms of welfare and efficiency. Meanwhile, it also casts doubt on the 
reliability of using any productivity measure to properly measure the technology 
catch-up performance in the light of the data constraints in our research. As a 
consequence, we have to seek other alternatives to address this issue more explicitly 
later.   
In terms of the productivity of R&D input, conventional output indicators, such as 
the value of gross output and value added, contain a limited direct contribution from 
R&D input, particularly in non-high-tech industries. Therefore, single R&D capital 
productivity and R&D labour productivity seldom appear in previous empirical studies 
which are grounded in the observations of the manufacturing industries as a whole 
(Goto and Suzuki, 1989; Griliches, 1979; Hall and Mairesse, 1995; Scherer, 1984). 
Seen in this light, a new output indicator that strictly relates to R&D input must be 
considered. In addition, such R&D input productivity measures must be positioned and 
interpreted very cautiously, since the disregard of cross-industry spillover, which is 
unavoidably caused by calculating productivity measures independently within a 
certain industry, tends to underestimate the real productivity of R&D input for those 
industries whose technology progress can exert great externalities. In response, more 
researchers have turned to analyze the relationship between R&D input and output 
growth so as to bypass the tricky spillover problem (Wang and Szirmai, 2003a). In this 
paper, we will adopt both approaches, aiming to generalize a sound conclusion by 
comparing their individual results.  
4 Results and Discussion 
Following the estimation steps explained in Section 3, we can estimate the 
productivity level of SOEs and FFEs in China’s high-tech industries on a comparable 
basis, because this approach measures the inputs and outputs of SOEs and FFEs using  
constant values at 1996 prices (Table 2-Table 5). Further, the productivity gap between 
SOEs and FFEs can be inferred by calculating SOEs’ comparative productivity 
performance (Wu, 2001) as the ratio of the productivity of SOEs to that of the FFEs in 
the same industry. Readers should concentrate on two concepts in the discussion below: 
first, the “productivity gap”, which will be “increased” (reduced) when the SOEs’ 
comparative productivity performance “declines” (climbs); second, the “comparative 
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productivity performance”, where a decline is in relative rather than absolute terms7. 
These two concepts will first assist us to reveal the SOEs’ catch-up trajectory in 
different terms of productivity in Section 4.1, and then allow us to analyze the role that 
competition has played in SOEs’ catch-up process in Section 4.2. Finally, section 4.3 
will particularly shed light on SOEs’ technology catch-up performance on account of 
the development of their indigenous technology capabilities. 
 
[Insert Table 2- Table 5 here] 
4.1 Productivity Gap: the Inverted U-shape Curve 
As depicted in Figure 1, for the high-tech industries as a whole, the SOEs’ 
comparative productivity performance in welfare and efficiency terms rose from 0.26 
to 0.72 and from 0.45 to 0.54 (FFE=1), respectively. The results indicate a significant 
catch-up of domestic enterprises measured by labour productivity, but a rather limited 
one measured by capital productivity. However, a further look at Figure 1 reveals a 
mixed story: since 1997, both the SOEs’ welfare performance and their efficiency 
performance compared with those of the FFEs’ have experienced a steady catch-up, 
which peaked separately at 0.82 in 2004 and 1.32 in 2003; in contrast, an obvious 
falling-behind followed afterwards where the comparative welfare performance 
dropped 10 percent and the comparative efficiency performance dropped 72 percent in 
2006. A polynomial fit of the geometric mean (the Fisher average) of the comparative 
welfare and efficiency performances after 1997 clearly generalizes this mixed story as 
an inverted U-shape curve (Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
 
Meanwhile, the trajectories of the comparative productivity performance of the R&D 
inputs: namely, R&D capital and R&D labour8, can also to some extent conform to the 
aforementioned inverted U-shape curve, but with two noteworthy differences: first, 
instead of a constant increase after 1997, the comparative productivity performances of  
R&D capital and labour continually stagnated until 2002; second, in spite of the brief 
catch-up after 2002 and the slight falling-behind thereafter, comparative productivity 
performances of R&D capital and labour both stay at rather low levels compared with 
those of conventional capital and labour. These contrasts actually reveal the unfortunate 
fact that, in terms of their capability to exploit R&D investment to generate innovation, 
the SOEs in China’s high-tech industries have only achieved a minor catch-up during 
the past decade and are far more disadvantaged compared with their positions measured 
by conventional inputs such as capital and labour. At this point, our research appears to 
                                                        
7
 Therefore, the comparative productivity performance of SOEs declines in the sense that it does not grow not as 
fast as that of the FFEs, or it declines more rapidly than that of the FFEs. The same applies to an increase in SOEs’ 
comparative productivity performance. 
8
 In response to the measurement issue we discussed at the end the of Section 3.4, the value added of the new 
products with a one-year lag has been chosen to calculate the productivity of R&D capital and R&D labour, taking 
account of their more direct causal relationship and the delayed effects of R&D inputs on outputs. 
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echo the suspicions concerning China’s indigenous technology capability in high-tech 
industries (Chen and Shi, 2005; Gilboy, 2004; OECD, 2002; Zhou and Sun, 2006).  
Furthermore, the optimism about the SOEs’ catch-up becomes more questionable on 
account of the common falling-behind identified after 2003, which has led people to 
investigate the causes of the previous catch-up. As has been pointed out in the relevant 
literature (Mattlin, 2007; OECD, 2002; Pearson, 2007; Zheng and Chen, 2007), the 
SOEs in China underwent a radical reform from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, 
which comprised three major components: economic revitalization; enterprise 
restructuring; and corporate governance reforms. For instance, a substantial number of 
redundant workers in SOEs have been taken off enterprise payrolls; the debt levels have 
been significantly reduced for larger SOEs through debt-equity swaps; and the stock 
sales of SOEs listed on Chinese and overseas stock markets have further allowed them 
to finance various liabilities. Such reform measures can, without doubt, can 
significantly and immediately improve SOEs’ comparative productivity performance, 
especially when it is measured by capital and labour as the input item. On the other 
hand, simultaneously with the Chinese government’s commitment to the diversification 
of large SOEs so as to include some private ownership of shares, the dominant 
ownership and control of these firms are to remain firmly in the hands of the state in 
order to carry out the imperative of the party-state. Meanwhile, the state also mandates 
the market structure characterized by the SOEs’ monopoly or oligopoly in selected 
lifeline industries, where some high-tech industries such as the Manufacture of Aircraft 
and Spacecraft, the Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment, and the 
Manufacture of Medical Equipment and Meters are fully or partially included (Mattlin, 
2007; Pearson, 2007). As a result, non-state investors are merely permitted to 
contribute funds to SOEs without sharing in control, which leaves those inherent 
problems of SOEs unresolved, such as the soft budget constraints. And, furthermore, 
SOEs’ managers are continually encouraged to rely on imported technologies to 
maximize their monopoly profits as a shortcut, rather than seriously endeavour to 
improve efficiency and develop indigenous technology capability for the long run. 
Therefore, the momentum of catch-up initiated by such superficial reforms is hard to 
maintain and would soon fade away. The inverted U-shape curve derived from the 
SOEs’ catch-up experience in China’s high-tech industries happens to justify this 
conclusion. 
4.2 Catch-up and Competition 
It was discussed in the previous section that the state monopoly in selected industries, 
or in other words, the dispersion of competition, should be accused as one of the main 
causes for the SOE’s inability to sustain their catch-up momentum. In this subsection, 
we attempt to briefly address this issue with further empirics from China’s high-tech 
industries in view of its importance in relation to the future direction of the reform. 
As is known, China’s high-tech industries are composed of some industries that are 
principally state monopolized, e.g. the Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft, some 
industries that are highly competitive, e.g. the Manufacture of Computers and Office 
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Equipment, and some industries where state monopoly and competition coexist yet are 
strictly segregated within regulated sub-industries, e.g. the Manufacture of Medical 
Equipment and Meters (Jin and Zedtwitz, 2008; Mattlin, 2007). Such a mixed 
composition has made the high-tech industries a favourable scenario to investigate the 
influence of competition on SOEs’ catch-up performance independently, while the 
effects of other determinants of SOEs’ productivity performance, e.g. the industrial 
characteristics, are also properly considered during the calculation of the 
within-industry comparative productivity. 
As shown in the study of Ning (2007), the information and communication 
technology (ICT) manufacturing sector is now the most open and competitive high-tech 
sector in China, and mainly comprises the Manufacture of Computers and Office 
Equipment industry and those competitive sub-industries of the Electronic and 
Telecommunications Equipment industry. Figure 3 presents the SOEs’ comparative 
productivity performances in the ICT sector9, with their performance in the high-tech 
industries as a whole as a benchmark. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Apparently, the SOEs in the ICT sector have a better comparative capital 
productivity performance than that of their peers in the high-tech industries as a whole: 
namely, the efficiency gap between SOEs and FFEs in the ICT sector is smaller than 
that in the high-tech industries as a whole all through the period from 1996 to 2006. A 
critic may argue here that historically the SOEs in the ICT sector could be more 
productive, and thus their superiority shown after 1996 should not be attributed to this 
sector’s relatively more competitive market structure. However, in addition to the 
quicker pace of catch-up in the comparative capital productivity10, SOEs in the ICT 
sector, in terms of their comparative productivity performance from the other three 
perspectives (see Figure 3), evidently started from an inferior position and later 
managed to catch up and exceed. While such dynamics indisputably support the 
conclusion that the competition in China’s high-tech industries tends to relatively 
accelerate the DEs’ catch-up, on the other hand, they also question the rationality of 
using state monopoly to improve the competitiveness of SOEs. 
4.3 R&D and the Indigenous Technology Capability 
We have as yet not been able to address the issue of the SOEs’ technology catch-up.  
In line with our discussion at the end of Section 3.4, the serious data constraint in this 
research has meant that the most appropriate productivity measurement of technology 
progress, viz. multifactor productivity, is unavailable. The total factor productivity 
(TFP) measurement, if taken as an alternative, is not reliable either, since our data do 
                                                        
9
 The comparative productivity of the ICT sector is measured by the geometric mean (the Fisher average) of the 
two sub-industries’ comparative productivities. 
10
 The SOEs’ average annual growth rate of comparative capital productivity in the ICT sector (14 percent) is 5 
percent higher than that in the total high-tech industries (9 percent).  
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not take account of the quality improvement of different inputs and will inevitably mix 
TFP with embodied technical progress (OECD, 2001; Triplett, 1989). However, with 
reference to the argument about China’s technology catch-up performance in the 
high-tech industries (Section 2), we found that the divergence in fact sources back to 
the judgment of whether the DEs have successfully developed their indigenous 
technology capabilities with their regular R&D inputs (Fan, 2006; Gilboy, 2004; 
Jefferson, 2005; Ning, 2007). Therefore, in an attempt to address this concern, another 
common and popular approach is being employed to examine the relationship between 
R&D and productivity: namely, taking R&D inputs as another type of capital which is 
to be added to the list of input variables in an aggregate production function (Goto and 
Suzuki, 1989; Griliches, 1994; Hall and Mairesse, 1995; Wang and Szirmai, 2005). 
 
The Model 
First, we define an aggregate production function in Cobb-Douglas style: 
 
λt α β γY=Ae K L R  (1) 
where Y is output; K and L represent, respectively the physical capital input and the 
labour input, R is the R&D input; A is a constant; λ is the rate of disembodied 
“external” technical change (t is the time trend); α is the output elasticity for the capital 
input; β is the output elasticity for the labour input; and γ is the output elasticity for the 
R&D input. Equation (1) can be simply transferred into logarithmic terms as : 
 
Log Y=Log A+ t+ Log K+ Log L+ Log Rλ α β γ  (2) 
for a straightforward estimation. In particular, if γ is estimated to be significant and 
positive, it can be concluded that the endogenous R&D activity has been integrated into 
the production process as an indispensable input, which signifies the development of an 
indigenous technology capability to create or adopt new technology and improve the 
volume of output (Furman and Hayes, 2004; Nelson and Pack, 1999). Empirically, 
Equation (2) has been estimated by Griliches (1980; 1986), and by Hall and Mairesse 
(1995) using longitudinal firm-level data, and by Griliches (1973) and Wang and 
Szirmai (2003a) using industry-level data. The estimated elasticity of output with 
respect to R&D input lies between 0.05 and 0.2, with the only estimate based on the 
Chinese data from high-tech industries being 0.11. 
 
Estimation Results 
The basic descriptive statistics that could be applied in the estimation of Equation (2) 
are described in Table 6 while the correlation matrix of the variables is displayed in 
Table 7. Apparently, an estimation that attempts to include all the independent variables 
listed in Equation (2) will result in a serious multicollinearity problem because of their 
fairly high correlation coefficients (Table 7). In response, we propose to respecify 
Equation (2) by combining and eliminating selected independent variables in order to 
mitigate multicollinearity. 
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[Insert Table 6- Table 7 here] 
 
With respect to the conventional inputs, the variable representing physical capital 
stock is more related to the output proxy, which means that it is more suitable than the 
labour variable to be retained in the model. The R&D capital stock variable also has a 
higher correlation coefficient on the output variable compared with that of the R&D 
labour variable. However, since the capital stock variable has already incorporated a 
great deal of the information from the R&D capital variable (a correlation coefficient of 
0.8423) while the R&D labour variable captures more information of the dropped 
labour variable (a correlation coefficient of 0.7789), we are inclined to keep the R&D 
labour variable, which is denoted by “R-Labour” in Equation (3), to represent the 
contributions from both R&D inputs and labour (Baum, 2006; Liu and Buck, 2007). As 
a result, Equation (2) is finally reduced to Equation (3) for the estimation: 
 
Log Y=Log A+ t+ Log K+ Log (R-Labour)λ α γ  (3) 
In Table 8, we report the estimation results for the SOEs in China’s high-tech 
industries. According to the outcome of the model specification test (Hausman test), the 
“fixed effect (within)” model has been chosen to estimate each independent variable’s 
coefficient: the output elasticity of capital is not significant; the output elasticity of 
R&D labour has a significant yet abnormal negative value; a very low R-square value at 
0.40 additionally indicates a poor goodness of fit. Further diagnostic statistics, i.e. the 
Wald test result and the Wooldridge test result, suggest that the estimation has been 
plagued by the heteroskedasticity across different industries and by the autocorrelation 
in panel data. In response, we switch to the estimation of the “robust fixed-effect 
model” by calculating the panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates, which can 
properly address problems such as groupwise heteroskedasticity, within panel 
autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation across panels (Baum, 2006). 
In the robust fixed-effect model, estimations based on the SOEs’ data, again deny the 
significant contribution from the R&D labour. Further, in spite of a significant and 
justifiable coefficient of the capital variable, the poor goodness of fit (0.39) still casts 
doubt on the underlying assumption of Equation (1)-(3) that R&D activities have been 
integrated into SOEs’ production process to generate indigenous technology capability. 
In contrast, estimations using the FFEs’ data yield significant and interpretable results 
for each variable and a much more acceptable goodness of fit (0.69). This sharp 
contrast, in combination with the analysis presented in Section 4.1, reveals that China’s 
DEs in high-tech industries have made very limited progress in the past decade in 
catching up with FFEs in terms of the development of indigenous technology 
capability. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In Wang and Szirmai’s (2003a) study, the overall capital stock of each high-tech 
industry was estimated by PIM without differentiati
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Meanwhile, they adopted R&D capital stock instead of R&D labour to estimate the 
contribution of R&D input to output growth (Equation (2)) measured by the value 
added. Their estimation of the output elasticity of R&D input (γ) is 0.1069. Liu and 
Buck (2007) estimated Equation (2) with the same new products’ value added as the 
output measurement that we used, and the R&D intensity (the ration of R&D 
expenditure to total sales) as the R&D input. Their results revealed a γ of 0.086 for the 
high-tech industries as a whole. Our estimation result of γ for FFEs is reasonably slight 
higher, because it has explicitly excluded the lower γ of the SOEs in comparison with 
the “mixed” results of the two foregoing studies. This comparison also proves that our 
estimation of γ is robust to the measurement selection of capital stock, output, and R&D 
input.  
5 Concluding Remarks 
This study contributes to the debate on whether China’s DEs have experienced a 
significant catch-up compared with FFEs in the high-tech industries. It has estimated a 
new set of capital stock and R&D capital stock by ownership for China’s high-tech 
industries. Then, based on the newly constructed data set, we have assessed SOEs’ (as 
the most important proxy for DEs) comparative productivity performance in the 
high-tech industries from 1996 to 2006. 
First, our findings identify an inverted U-shape curve to generalize SOEs’ 
productivity catch-up performance. The common relative falling-behind after 2003 and 
the rather low productivities of R&D input together stress the necessity to sustain the 
SOEs’ catch-up with deeper structural and institutional reforms rather than rely on 
short-term policy subsidies. 
Secondly, since a better catch-up performance has been found in those industries (i.e. 
the ICT sector) that are more open and competitive, our findings strongly oppose 
excessive state monopoly in the high-tech industries, which in the long run removes the 
pressure for SOEs to maintain their catch-up efforts. 
Lastly, our findings reveal that the SOEs in China’s high-tech industries have so far 
failed to develop their own indigenous technology capability, which is embodied by the 
integration of R&D in the production process as an indispensable input. In comparison 
with their clear catch-up in terms of welfare and efficiency, SOEs’ technology catch-up 
measured by indigenous technology capability is still stumbling. 
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Figure 1  Comparative productivity performances of SOEs in China’s High-tech 
Industries, 1996-2006 (FFEs= 1) 
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Figure 2  The geometric mean of comparative capital and labour productivity 
performances of SOEs in China’s high-tech industries (polynomial fit), 1997-2006 
(FFEs=1) 
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Figure 3  Comparative productivity performance of SOEs in China’s ICT sector, 
1996-2006 (FFEs= 1) 
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Table 1  The Codes for High-tech Industries in China’s “Industrial Classification for 
National Economic Activities” (ICNEA) 
 
ICNEA 
GB/T4754-2002 
ISIC 
Revision 3 
Manufacture of Medical and Pharmaceutical Products  27 2423 
 1.Chemical Pharmaceutical Products  2710&2720  
 2. Processing of Traditional Chinese Medicine  2730&2740  
 3. Biology Products  2750  
Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft  376 353 
1. Manufacture and Repair of Aircraft  3761  
2. Manufacture of Spacecraft  3762  
Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment  40 32 
 1. Telecommunication Equipment  401  
 Telecommunication Transmission Unit  4011  
 Telecommunication Exchange Unit  4012  
 Telecommunication Terminal Unit  4013  
 2. Radar and Peripheral Equipment  4020  
 3. Broadcast and Television Equipment  403  
 4.Electronic Apparatus  405  
 Electronic Vacuum Apparatus  4051  
 Semiconductor Separated Parts  4052  
 Integrated Circuits  4053  
 5.Electronic Components  406  
 6. Household Audiovisual Equipment  407  
 7. Other Electronic Equipment  4090  
Manufacture of Computers and Office Equipment  404& 415 30 
 1. Computers  4041  
 2.Peripheral Equipment of Computer  4043  
 3. Office Equipment  415  
Manufacture of Medical Equipment and Meters  368&411 33 
 1.Medical Equipment and Instruments  368  
 2.Instruments and Meters  411  
Note: The terminology for each respective industry in accordance to the ISIC code above is: 
Pharmaceuticals-2423; Aircraft and Spacecraft-353; Radio, TV and Communication 
Equipment-32; Office and Computing Machinery-30; Medical, Precision and Optical 
Equipment-33. 
Sources: (OECD, 2004, 2006).
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Table 2  Summary of Capital Productivity1 of FFEs and SOEs in China’s High-tech 
Industries, 1996-2006 
ICNEA FFEs SOEs 
 
1996-2001
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1996-2006 
(%) 
1996-2001 
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1996-2006 
(%) 
Total  1.10 1.05  21.53 0.64  0.83  119.61 
27 1.17  1.36  31.23 0.70  0.83  66.51 
2710&2720 0.91  1.17  68.32 0.53  0.61  56.36 
2730&2740 2.32  1.68  -18.8 1.84  2.23  117.02 
2750 1.61  3.54  -23.19 0.73  1.06  96.54 
376 0.61  0.59  143.98 0.25  0.40  66.69 
3761 0.67  0.59  143.34 0.25  0.39  54.94 
3762 N/A N/A N/A 0.24  0.46  185.60 
40 0.95  0.83  19.17 0.91  1.05  165.98 
401 1.48  1.88  483.57 1.62  2.69  456.10 
4011 1.84  1.66  5.48 0.92  1.36  156.50 
4012 1.98  1.72  29.41 2.72  3.26  549.61 
4013 1.72  1.16  -23.49 0.97  1.47  336.62 
4020 N/A N/A N/A 0.31  0.66  126.07 
403 N/A 2.07  N/A 0.20  1.16  673.64 
405 0.41  0.38  -29.65 0.53  0.55  69.72 
4051 0.35  0.29  -57.07 0.70  0.48  17.38 
4052 2.04  0.39  -79.35 0.38  0.64  190.89 
4053 0.47  0.34  -51.02 0.22  0.81  784.92 
406 1.21  0.78  -36.68 0.50  0.66  141.61 
407 1.33  1.64  32.18 1.37  1.55  129.56 
4090 2.21  1.89  26.42 1.81  1.30  189.05 
404& 415 2.28  1.93  -6.50 2.12  2.40  167.35 
4041 4.28  2.75  169.80 1.94  3.01  373.15 
4043 2.63  1.60  -63.86 4.41  2.57  72.67 
415 2.51  2.14  -1.31 0.23  1.35  361.83 
368&411 1.39  1.94  39.96 0.41  0.72  143.78 
368 1.42  2.64  56.80 0.93  1.28  104.06 
411 1.39  1.78  41.32 0.36  0.67  160.04 
Note: 1. Capital productivity is calculated by dividing the volume of value added with the volume 
of capital stock.  
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Table 3  Summary of Labour Productivity 1 of FFEs and SOEs in China’s High-tech 
Industries, 1996-2006 
ICNEA FFEs SOEs 
 
1996-2001
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1996-2006 
(%) 
1996-2001 
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1996-2006 
(%) 
Total  10.16 13.71 112.35 4.01 9.51 489.50 
27 11.01 16.24 118.20 3.87 8.77 411.25 
2710&2720 11.12 19.13 176.97 3.52 7.89 370.94 
2730&2740 10.23 12.35 52.81 4.67 10.42 442.95 
2750 13.74 22.25 138.17 5.55 11.18 314.55 
376 5.88 18.42 -298.46 1.97 5.23 538.25 
3761 5.99 18.61 -300.90 2.00 5.12 500.20 
3762 N/A 10.41 N/A 1.81 6.74 963.18 
40 9.59 12.44 126.25 5.70 12.94 452.27 
401 21.99 28.23 260.34 9.35 20.58 385.95 
4011 19.03 16.68 20.61 5.89 10.46 337.78 
4012 34.47 42.76 111.86 19.35 41.35 209.56 
4013 14.16 14.08 80.56 4.99 8.78 330.28 
4020 N/A N/A -91.17 1.59 6.71 741.73 
403 4.48 6.27 182.31 1.04 4.73 1275.85 
405 10.34 15.27 81.18 5.12 10.35 241.68 
4051 17.98 22.01 4.86 7.09 11.01 74.30 
4052 5.02 9.73 248.08 2.02 6.81 671.65 
4053 7.49 18.68 274.28 5.00 15.77 1994.66 
406 5.11 7.15 136.44 2.42 7.16 900.34 
407 9.14 11.51 81.71 8.02 15.94 368.58 
4090 6.04 8.18 121.12 5.57 12.74 1196.00 
404& 415 15.40 17.39 12.77 11.17 21.59 276.94 
4041 21.37 23.66 -4.02 13.18 30.35 709.93 
4043 15.07 15.14 3.19 9.93 14.64 26.34 
415 10.04 16.01 79.16 2.02 9.15 529.72 
368&411 5.91 10.95 230.09 1.83 5.24 726.35 
368 6.59 14.02 195.30 2.22 5.39 294.85 
411 5.65 10.03 256.32 1.76 5.21 830.98 
Note: 1. Labour productivity is calculated by dividing the volume of value added with the volume 
of industrial employment. The unit here is 10 thousand RMB per worker. 
23 
 
Table 4  Summary of R&D Capital Productivity 1 of FFEs and SOEs in China’s 
High-tech Industries, 1997-2006 
ICNEA FFEs SOEs 
 
1997-2001
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1997-2006 
(%) 
1997-2001 
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1997-2006 
(%) 
Total  24.83 20.46 5.09 4.40 6.81 40.25 
27 4.12 4.22  23.01  2.53  4.39  154.53  
2710&2720 4.56 4.98  28.40  2.83  4.20  128.95  
2730&2740 1.96 2.39  82.50  2.46  7.13  147.76  
2750 N/A N/A N/A 0.57  1.52  438.22  
376 N/A N/A N/A 1.26  3.14  275.41  
3761 N/A N/A N/A 1.33  3.63  295.55  
3762 N/A N/A N/A 0.94  0.39  -34.07  
40 25.21 18.72  -43.09  9.97  10.45  -32.01  
401 19.57 17.60  64.47  5.89  9.46  -48.12  
4011 N/A N/A N/A 10.08  4.23  -62.21  
4012 6.55 6.24  215.30  4.46  9.40  -91.38  
4013 140.17 17.49  -94.02  6.03  10.24  303.88  
4020 N/A N/A N/A 1.58  4.11  334.79  
403 N/A N/A N/A 1.00  1.86  320.65  
405 17.60 18.07  -37.85  6.79  8.73  -13.52  
4051 18.50 12.06  -60.16  12.82  8.02  -67.41  
4052 N/A N/A N/A 1.33  2.74  134.05  
4053 14.80 14.26  150.53  4.56  7.46  4.22  
406 48.47 18.45  -86.36  5.10  6.02  169.48  
407 41.52 25.53  -72.44  31.94  15.81  -71.79  
4090 8.17 2.15  -55.91  6.13  8.37  13.35  
404& 415 98.23 36.13  -69.80  6.72  9.82  -36.32  
4041 236.28 35.33  552.78  7.09  10.34  -34.43  
4043 97.87 38.25  -79.47  7.26  8.33  -61.57  
415 N/A N/A N/A 1.49  12.67  549.92  
368&411 18.41 11.26  -64.30  4.08  4.41  6.79  
368 5.34 4.88  0.18  4.56  5.23  64.25  
411 43.00 14.84  -84.75  4.05  4.30  -1.68  
Note: 1. R&D Capital productivity is calculated by dividing the volume of new products’ value 
added with the volume of R&D capital stock in the previous year.  
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Table 5  Summary of R&D Labour Productivity 1 of FFEs and SOEs in China’s 
High-tech Industries, 1997-2006 
ICNEA FFEs SOEs 
 
1997-2001
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1997-2006 
(%) 
1997-2001 
Mean 
2002-2006 
Mean 
Growth Rate 
1997-2006 
(%) 
Total  11.91  12.91  87.15  0.79  2.43  223.19  
27 3.11  3.22  -5.55  0.75  1.77  288.13  
2710&2720 4.08  4.14  -31.02  0.90  1.74  246.22  
2730&2740 1.37  1.86  58.50  0.50  3.74  261.60  
2750 4.51  1.83  82.85  0.15  0.57  892.19  
376 N/A 5.05  N/A 0.22  0.87  642.82  
3761 N/A 5.05  N/A 0.23  0.95  716.94  
3762 N/A N/A N/A 0.23  0.16  -9.73  
40 11.86  12.05  41.32  1.93  4.93  75.64  
401 9.91  15.81  463.35  1.34  7.64  -10.97  
4011 N/A 0.62  N/A 1.91  3.50  105.48  
4012 3.80  7.39  737.13  1.21  12.35  -93.02  
4013 42.91  17.09  -12.25  1.08  5.49  394.36  
4020 N/A N/A N/A 0.31  1.15  1035.47  
403 N/A N/A N/A 0.13  0.74  1373.36  
405 14.67  12.76  -70.67  0.82  3.76  214.32  
4051 25.61  12.34  -86.84  2.59  4.28  81.91  
4052 2.06  12.58  215.90  0.19  0.71  231.73  
4053 83.08  9.81  82.89  0.66  5.32  782.27  
406 12.41  7.42  -75.80  0.80  2.09  853.21  
407 20.34  16.78  145.28  9.02  14.72  -43.37  
4090 1.38  4.51  2405.34  1.03  2.12  454.86  
404& 415 36.00  22.20  -37.62  1.16  5.55  114.89  
4041 N/A 28.52  1490.61  1.14  6.98  261.30  
4043 46.88  22.39  -62.55  2.26  5.20  -43.53  
415 N/A 6.91  N/A 0.32  4.85  601.77  
368&411 3.72  3.95  45.57  0.36  0.98  279.30  
368 1.94  3.09  91.15  0.72  2.46  564.65  
411 4.89  4.08  40.30  0.33  0.89  250.47  
Note: 1. R&D Labour productivity is calculated by dividing the volume of new products’ value 
added with the volume of working time. The unit here is 1 million RMB per man-year.  
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Table 6  Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log Y 911 4.17 1.69 -3.84 8.46 
(the log of value added)      
Log K 898 4.36 1.55 -0.19 8.55 
(the log of capital stock)      
Log L 919 2.10 1.59 -7.01 5.97 
(the log of the number in employment)      
Log R 
Log R-Capital 825 1.98 1.59 -3.56 6.27 
(the log of the R&D capital stock)      
Log R-Labour 885 2.92 1.65 -2.81 6.89 
(The log of the R&D labour input)      
 
 
 
 
Table 7  Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
 
Log 
Y 
Log 
K 
Log 
L 
Log R-Capital Log R-Labour 
Log Y 
1.000
0 
    
Log K 
0.851
3 
1.000
0 
   
Log L 
0.822
6 
0.866
7 
1.000
0 
  
Log R-Capital 
0.799
7 
0.842
3 
0.738
3 
1.0000  
Log R-Labour 
0.660
3 
0.792
4 
0.778
9 
0.8827 1.0000 
 
 
26 
 
Table 8  Estimation Results Based on the SOEs’ Data 
 Dependent Variable: Log Y 
Independent Variables 
Fixed-Effect 
Model 
Robust Fixed-Effect 
Model 
 (SOEs) (SOEs) (FFEs) 
Log A 2.99*** 0.79 1.44*** 
 (0.27) (0.54) (0.13) 
t 0.11*** 0.08 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
Log K 0.11 0.53*** 0.57*** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.03) 
Log R-Labour -0.18*** 0.04 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) 
Diagnostic Statistics    
R-square 0.40 0.39 0.69 
Hausman test 97.59***   
Wald test 14292.35***   
Wooldridge test 113.34***   
Num. of obs./ Num. of Groups 308/ 28 308/ 28 269/ 26 
Note: The standard error is shown in parentheses; ***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix 
A. Basic Data 
Table A-1  Price Indexes Used in the Calculation of Capital Stocks and R&D Capital Stocks 
1996-2006 
  Ex-Factory Price Index of 
Industrial Products as the 
Deflator of Value Added 
 
Actual Wage Price Index  
Investment in Fixed 
Assets Price Index 
    Average SOEs FFEs   
1996 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1997 
 
0.997 
 
1.011 1.042 1.032 1.017 
1998 
 
0.956 
 
1.084 1.112 1.014 1.015 
1999 
 
0.933  1.226 1.255 1.126 1.011 
2000 
 
0.959  1.366 1.392 1.249 1.022 
2001 
 
0.947  1.573 1.618 1.370 1.026 
2002 
 
0.926  1.817 1.881 1.506 1.028 
2003 
 
0.947  2.035 2.113 1.646 1.051 
2004 
 
1.005  2.249 2.347 1.777 1.110 
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2005 
 
1.054  2.536 2.666 1.962 1.127 
2006 
 
1.086  2.859 3.008 2.199 1.144 
 
    Source: (NBS, 2007a). 
 
 
B. Other Data Estimated 
Table B-1  Summary of Capital Stocks in China’s High-tech Industries by Ownership, 2006 
 100 million RMB in 1996 price FFEs SOEs Overall 
 Capital Stock 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate1 (%) 
Capital Stock 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Capital Stock 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Total  5742.75 27.73 2094.02 8.57 8810.95 16.92 
Manufacture of Medical and Pharmaceutical Products  351.87 17.37 626.12 10.24 1536.75 20.26 
Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft  47.73 47.08 480.51 5.31 529.49 5.59 
Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment  4064.25 27.92 788.56 11.90 5164.09 19.42 
Manufacture of Computers and Office Equipment  1107.51 38.03 59.54 24.58 1197.54 29.53 
Manufacture of Medical Equipment and Meters  171.40 30.59 139.25 4.10 383.09 8.79 
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Note: 1. The estimation is based on the data from 1996 to 2006. 
Source: (NBS, 2002, 2007b). 
Table B-2  Summary of R&D Capital Stocks in China’s High-tech Industries by Ownership, 2006 
100 million RMB in 1996 price FFEs SOEs Overall 
 Capital Stock 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Capital Stock 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Capital Stock 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Total  379.30 38.53 278.84 11.51 856.35 21.34 
Manufacture of Medical and Pharmaceutical Products  26.74 15.68 33.23 6.73 100.82 13.52 
Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft  N/A N/A 73.62 4.92 84.66 6.36 
Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment  250.97 41.89 138.80 19.53 526.55 30.73 
Manufacture of Computers and Office Equipment  90.71 90.65 17.90 21.24 108.74 41.23 
Manufacture of Medical Equipment and Meters  9.79 41.51 15.28 13.10 35.82 14.52 
Source: Ibid. 
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
CPC    the Communist Party of China 
DEs    Domestic Enterprises 
FFs    Foreign Firms 
FFEs    Foreign-funded Enterprises 
GERD   Gross Expenditure on R&D 
HMT    Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
HTDZs   High-Tech Development Zones 
IC    Industrial Classification 
ICNEA   Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities 
ICT    Information and Communication Technology 
IIS    Independent Innovation Strategy 
LMEs   Large- and Medium-sized Enterprises 
MNCs   Multi National Corporations 
MOF    Ministry of Finance 
NIS    National Innovation System 
NBS    National Bureau of Statistics 
PIM    Perpetual Inventory Method 
R&D    Research and Development 
SNA    System of National Accounts 
S&T    Science and Technology 
S&T Guidelines “National Guidelines on a Medium- and Long-term Programme for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020” 
SOEs    State-owned Enterprises 
 
 
